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FOREWORD

In late 1979, the AICPA Federal Tax Division formed a task force,

under the direction of the Tax Policy Subcommittee, to study the
problems of tax revenue losses due to underreported income.

The

objective was to consider the various problems and issues and to pre

sent recommendations for possible approaches to improve reporting of

income.

This report embodies the results of the task force study.

It is now widely recognized that loss of tax revenue from
underreported income (also referred to as the compliance gap, the
underground economy, the hidden economy)

system.

The so-called tax gap is enormous by anyone’s estimate and is

growing larger.
(TEFRA)

is a major problem in the tax

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982

includes many measures aimed at reducing this revenue loss.

Some of the possible solutions discussed in this study have been
adopted in TEFRA; others have not. , This study is offered as a contri

bution to the ongoing debate about the problem of underreported

income.
Over two years of dedicated work went into the development of

this study, and the members of the task force —
Donald H. Skadden, Chairman

John Gilbert
Donald M. Tannenbaum

Rufus Hardy

have earned the appreciation of the AICPA Federal Tax Division.
Mr. Skadden’s tireless efforts, in particular, were instrumental in
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INTRODUCTION

The intentional underpayment of taxes is certainly not a new phe

nomenon.

It has been a common problem since biblical times.

The

scope and magnitude of the problem have varied from time to time and

from country to country, but underpayment has been a serious concern
for centuries.

The citizens’ attitudes and their inclination to

underpay can vary from one type of tax to another.

For example,

within the United States the high level of noncompliance with the per

sonal property tax has caused many jurisdictions either to abolish or
modify that system; however, during this same time span there has been

a high degree of voluntary compliance with the self-assessed income
tax.
Since World War II, however, voluntary compliance in the United

States has deteriorated, and during the past ten or fifteen years this
unfortunate development has reached serious proportions.

Various stud

ies indicate that the federal tax shortfall due to the underreporting
of income may be as high as $70 billion to $120 billion.

If such

amounts were collected in full, the federal budget could be balanced
and/or tax rates could be decreased significantly.

This situation

presents a serious equity issue: The honest taxpayers are bearing an
ever-increasing burden because of the growing number of citizens who

are not paying their full tax.

perpetuating cycle.

This can easily become a self-

As the honest taxpayers’ burden increases, the

growing inequity of the situation may convince them that they are
5

paying an unfair share.

This, in turn, could motivate more of them to

join that segment of society that is not paying what the law requires,
and might ultimately lead to the breakdown of the voluntary compliance

system itself.
In addition, if the situation continues to worsen, it could lead

to the disruption of our economy and even to a breakdown in society if

Congress finds itself unable to raise sufficient revenue.

In all

likelihood, if the situation threatens to approach such proportions,
Congress will feel compelled to adopt a system quite different from
the self-assessment system we have enjoyed for so many years.

The Federal Tax Division of the American Institute of CPAs has

recognized that CPAs have valid reasons to be concerned about this
situation.

Accountants are concerned with the growing inequities

among citizens and have a professional interest in maintaining the
viability of the voluntary compliance system.

This report addresses the terminology and scope of the problem,
the nature of underground income, possible causes of underreporting,

the situation abroad, public opinion, and possible ways to alleviate
the problem.

An extensive bibliography and a list of references

include citations to significant articles, books, and special studies

related to the underground economy..

The parenthetic numbers in the

text refer to the corresponding items in the list of references..
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

While it is recognized that underreporting of income will never
be completely cured, this report suggests several specific actions
that could help alleviate the inequities and contain the growth of the

underground economy.

The areas of concern, types of recommendations,

and some of the specific suggestions are outlined below.

Enforcement activities

o

The IRS should redirect some of its efforts toward the
underground economy.

Penalties
o

Current penalties for both civil and criminal fraud
should be reexamined.

Informational reporting
o

Reporting should be extended to include business payments

to corporations, transactions with barter exchanges, auction

houses, dealers in collectibles, and large currency
transactions.

o

Tax returns should be modified to provide more information

and to ease matching with informational forms.
Withholding should be required on —

o

Business payments to independent contractors.

o

Interest and dividend payments.

(The government should

bear the administrative burden or the cost thereof.)
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o

Taxable pension payments.

o

State tax refunds.

Currency reform
o

Encouraging the use of checks and credit cards and
discouraging the use of currency might deter transactions

that are common to certain facets of the underground
economy.

Tip income

o

A special conference should be held to explore new and
innovative approaches to this perplexing problem area.

Education programs
o

It is probable that some taxpayers underreport income

because they do not understand that —

The income is taxable.

The risk they are running by underreporting is

significant.
Their actions have consequences for the economy and
the country.

o

The IRS should expand and improve its educational efforts.

o

Some educational efforts would have greater credibility and
acceptance if provided by groups outside the government.

8

Therefore, the AICPA should seek to enlist the support of
other organizations in an effort to conduct an extensive

national education program.
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TERMINOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Several labels have been coined for that part of the economy that
consists of income concealed from the tax collectors.

The most common

seems to be "underground economy"; authors have also used "subterranean,"
"clandestine," "irregular," and "hidden" economy.

The Internal

Revenue Service has subdivided the area into the "illegal economy" and

the "informal economy."

Illegal describes the underlying transactions

and includes prostitution, gambling, drugs, extortion, embezzlement,
and the like.

In the informal economy, the activities are legal but

are not reported properly, or not reported at all, for tax purposes.

The charge to the Task Force was to examine only the informal
segment of the underground economy to determine how the accounting

profession could assist in alleviating the problem and what additional
measures the government or others could take to improve compliance

with the income tax statutes.

We have not attempted to measure the dollar volume of the
underground economy.

The several studies that undertook that task

have shown widely varying results, but all of them indicate that the

problem is serious enough to deserve the attention of CPAs and other
responsible citizens.
The earliest relevant study was reported in 1977 by Peter M.
Gutmann, an economist from Baruch College of the City University of

New York (11, 12, 13).

He estimated that approximately $176 billion in

income was going unreported in 1976, approximately one third of it

from illegal activities and the other two thirds from the informal
10

economy.

Gutmann’s estimates were based on an examination of the

stock of money (Ml), composed of currency plus demand deposits.

Gutmann stated that from 1937 to 1941 the underground economy was
small.

Using that base period, he found that currency averaged $217

per $1,000 of demand deposits.

Gutmann then determined that by 1976

■currency in circulation had reached $344 per $l,000 of demand deposits
(an increase of $127 per $1,000, or 36.9 percent).

Gutmann therefore

inferred that of the $77.8 billion in circulation in 1976, 36.9 per

cent, or $28.77 billion, was used to fund the underground economy.
The other $49.1 billion of currency in circulation, plus the $226.2
billion of demand deposits, made up the total money supply in the

regular, reported economy.

The total money supply of $304 billion

supported a GNP of $1,869 billion.

Gutmann therefore concluded that

the $28.7 billion was supporting an unreported economy of $176
billion.
Gutmann noted that currency held abroad, or used to store ill-

gotten wealth, is. not subtracted before estimating the unreported GNP.

Furthermore, on the basis of the $176 billion generated in the
underground economy, Gutmann estimated that up to 1.6 million more
workers may have been employed than were reflected in official
statistics.

In a later study, he revised this estimate to 5 to 6

million workers who are employed only in the underground economy (10).
Tn 1978 Edgar L. Feige, an economist from the University of

Wisconsin, estimated the underground economy at $400 billion (7, 8).
Feige questioned Gutmann’s assumptions relating to the base period
chosen, an unchanging ratio of currency to demand deposits, the use of
11

currency as the exclusive medium of exchange in the underground econ

omy, and the same amount of GNP generated by reported and unreported
dollars.

Instead, Feige used the sum of all transactions to estimate

total macroeconomic activity.

The ratio of total transactions (using

the estimated life of circulating currency) to observed income was

determined.

The ratio for the benchmark year, 1939, was used to esti

mate GNP without an underground economy.

The difference between the

estimated and actual GNP produced Feige’s approximations of the
underground economy.
As with Gutmann, some of Feige's assumptions are questionable:
the choice of an appropriate base year, the assumed nonexistence of an

underground economy in 1939, the relative income velocity in the

irregular and regular economies, the estimates of turnover rates of
demand deposits and currency, and the exclusion of barter transactions

from the estimates.

Gutmann and Feige used entirely different methodologies, yet each
estimated that the underground economy was growing two or three times
faster than the regular economy.

Both men revised their estimates in

1981, raising them to $420 billion and $800 billion, respectively.

These estimates suggest that as much as 10 to 25 percent of GNP may be
unreported .

Moreover, since these amounts are excluded from national income

statistics, it is apparent that many of the widely followed macroeco

nomic measurements are erroneous, and the judgements based thereon may
be misleading.

Such measurements as national income, GNP, unemployment

and inflation are seriously misstated, because they do not take into
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consideration the underground economy.

Yet many government and busi

ness decisions are based upon those numbers,

including the automatic

indexation of social security benefits, many wage contracts, changes
in the money supply, and various social programs.

In 1979, the IRS published the results of a special study of 1976

incomes (14).

The IRS estimated that individuals had failed to report

approximately $135 billion of income in 1976.

Of this, about $100

billion was income from legal sources, which should have produced some
$17 billion of income tax.

The report, quite appropriately, pointed

out that during the same year individuals did report $1.73 trillion of
income and paid $142 billion in taxes.

Thus, it was estimated that in

1976, 92.6 percent of income from legal sources was reported.

The IRS

estimated the unreported amount of legal income from various sources
as follows:

- 13 -

Individual Income 1976
(Dollar amounts are shown at the midpoint of ranges estimated
by the IRS.)

Billions of Dollars
Reported
Unreported
Salaries and wages

$

881

$ 24

Percent
Unreported

2.6%

Dividends and income from
subchapter S corporations

25

3.5

12.3

Interest

49

6.5

11.7

Capital gains

19

4

17.4

Self-employment

60

36

37.5

6

Rents and royalties
Pensions, annuities, estates,
and trust

27

7

Other
Totals

$1,074

14

4.5

42.9

5

15.6

2.5

26.3

$ 86

7.4%

This table indicates that in all categories other than salaries
and wages, $193 billion was reported, but $62 billion, or 24.3 per
cent, was not reported.

When this 24.3 percent unreported is compared

to the 2.6 percent of salaries and wages unreported, it is easy to see

the significant effect of withholding.

As would be expected, some of

the above estimates are more reliable than others.

Jerome Kurtz, at

that time commissioner of internal revenue, indicated to our task

force that the interest and dividend figures were quite firm, whereas
the self-employment estimate was rather soft.
These estimates were derived from several data sources.

The

Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) provided information on
the nature and extent of compliance, using stratified random sampling

of returns filed.

Discriminant analysis was employed to divide tax

payers into ten classes, each of which had a distinct compliance pro
file.

Selected returns were examined for compliance, and data were

weighted appropriately to obtain summary statistics.

Data on non

filers were obtained from the Exact Match File (23), which had been
developed from interviews of 50,000 households.

This program was

directed toward nonfilers having substantial tax due, and thus did not
include nonfiling taxpayers with smaller incomes.

Other information

from a file on employee compensation permitted estimation of the

amount of nonfiler wage income.

Total income received by individuals

was compared with total income reported on tax returns using macroeco

nomic data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
In the previous table, no attempt was made to distinguish between

underreporting and nonfiling because of the limitations of the data.
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These sources provided only the beginning points for many of the esti

mates made in the study.

As noted earlier, some types of information

are more reliable than others.

For example, information on income

subject to withholding is of a higher quality than that on rents and
royalties.

Some preliminary figures on the "Gross Tax Gap" were released in
March 1982 as part of Commissioner Roscoe Egger's statement before the

Senate Finance Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight of the Internal
Revenue Service.

These figures are included here to illustrate the

growth in the underground economy.

It should be noted that these 1982

figures report unpaid taxes, whereas the 1976 table reflects unreported

income.

The 1982 report covers income tax only and does not include

social security or unemployment taxes, which would undoubtedly be
large amounts.

The 1982 study also covers the illegal sector for

which the estimated tax gap was in the range of $6.1 billion to $9.8

billion in 1981.
Some reports issued during the fall of 1982 indicated that the

earlier measures of the informal economy might have been substantially
overstated.

However, as stated before, we have not attempted to

measure the magnitude of the underground economy nor do we endorse the
methodologies or results of any of the studies.

All of the studies

indicate that this is a serious problem that needs prompt attention.
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Gross Tax Gap From Individual Income Tax Returns Filed, Nonfilers, and
Corporate Tax, Tax Years 1973, 1976, 1979, and 1981

Amount of Tax Gap
(Billions of Dollars)

1981

1979

1976

1973

$ 2.5
2.3
3.6
4.1
9.1
26.2
1.4
2.8
1.5
1.3
5.5
.5
1.7
.4
.1
3.1

$ 1.8
1.7
3.1
2.9
8.5
17.5
1.7
2.3
1.2
.8
3.1
.4
1.2
.3
*
2.4

$

$

$66.1

$49.0

$30.6

$20.5

$12.3

$ 9.4

$ 6.2

$ 4.8

4.9

3.4

2.2

1.2

$83.3

$61.8

$39.0

$26.5

3.9

4.7

3.6

2.8

$87.2

$66.5

$42.6

$29.3

Individual Tax
Tax loss from underreported income:

Wages
Tips
Dividends
Interest
Capital gains
Nonfarm business
Farm business
Pensions
Rents
Royalties
Partnerships
Estates and trusts
Small business corporations
State income tax refunds
Alimony
Other

Tax loss from overstated deductions,
and credits**

Nonfilers**
Total individual tax gap

Corporate Tax**
Total tax gap from legal sector

.7
1.4
1.5
1.3
5.1
11.6
1.7
1.1
.6
.4
2.5
.3
1.2
.1
*
1.0

.6
.9
.9
.9
2.0
9.6
1.5
.7
.4
.1
1.5
.2
.4
.1
*
.6

*Less than $100 million
**These are preliminary IRS figures and have not been reviewed by the
Office of Tax Analysis.

Note:

Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
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THE NATURE OF UNDERGROUND INCOME

It is clear that some types of income are more easily understated

or omitted from a tax return than others.

Thus, the underground econ

omy thrives on income not subject to withholding or to informational

reporting.

Currency transactions are easier to hide from the tax

collector than business conducted with checks.

Both currency and

checks are more susceptible to underreporting than are credit card
transactions.

Barter transactions bypass all records—currency,

checks, and credit cards—and are the most difficult to detect.

A barrage of articles in the popular media have identified a wide
variety of underground activities, ranging from the very small to the

very large, such as—
o

Skimming, including businesses that simply fail to record some

of their cash sales, cab drivers who leave a few fares off the
trip sheet, and merchants who take home television sets and

write them off as shoplifting.

o

Tips that are pocketed tax-free.

o

Domestic help paid in currency.

o

Wage earners who moonlight in second jobs and are paid in

currency.
o

Building tradesmen or auto mechanics who do extra jobs on
their own time.

o

Professionals who exchange services.

o

Business travelers who "pad" expense accounts and do not

report reimbursements as income.
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o

Unemployed workers or social security retirees who do odd jobs

for cash while drawing benefits.

o

Taxable use of business property and other taxable perquisites
of business executives.

o

Income that is paid directly into a foreign bank account.

o

Garage sales and flea markets.

o

Arts and crafts sold by the maker.

o

Exchanges of goods or services through one of the many barter
clubs or barter exchanges that have sprung up in recent years.

A number of articles in the popular media reveal a lack of

understanding of the tax law and the tax system.
distinguish tax avoidance from tax evasion.

Some writers fail to

They appear to condemn

all wealthy taxpayers and businesses who avail themselves of the tax

incentives intended by Congress to encourage precisely those activ
ities in which the businesses are engaged.

A Washington Post article,

(18) included as an underground activity any business incorporated in
a Caribbean tax haven to avoid U.S. taxes.

While such articles may

be inappropriate and unfair, they may indicate a public perception

that is nurturing the underground economy.

The belief that big busi

nesses and the wealthy are avoiding taxes may influence individuals to

rationalize their own do-it-yourself tax loopholes.
Some of the underground activities listed previously can produce

cash with little or no taxable income.

For example, garage sales are

often mentioned as part of the underground economy; however, the sale

of furniture, clothing, and other household items seldom gives rise to
a recognized gain.

Other than relatively valuable items—such as
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jewelry, sterling silverware, antiques, or art objects—few personal
assets are likely to be sold for a price in excess of their original

Even in underground sales where the transaction is of a taxable

cost.

nature, the taxable income is not the full cash received but only the
excess over the adjusted basis of the property sold.

While the sale

of certain items may result in taxable gain, the sale of others may
result in nondeductible losses.

This generates a perception of

unfairness that may cause some gains to go unreported.

Another segment of the underground economy that may not generate

much taxable income includes part-time work and work for very low

wages.

The allowable exemptions and the standard deduction have

increased the tax threshold to a point where much of the income from
part-time student help, domestic workers, migrant workers and other

farm employees, and many tips would not create a tax liability.

The

underreporting of such income is not to be condoned, but its impor

tance must be viewed in perspective to the total underground economy.
This is not to suggest that all small amounts be ignored.

Small

amounts on many returns can add up to significant revenue losses for
the government.

Bartering
Bartering presents especially troublesome enforcement problems
and may be one of the most rapidly growing areas in the underground

economy.

It covers a wide range of transactions—from neighbors

exchanging baby-sitting or other favors, to doctors and dentists
trading their professional services, to airlines exchanging otherwise

20

unused spaces on planes for otherwise unused rooms in hotel chains.

A

relatively new phenomenon, the barter exchange allows individuals or

corporations to provide merchandise or render services in exchange for
bookkeeping credits.

Those credits can be used at a later time to

obtain any of a wide variety of goods or services advertised in the
barter exchange catalog.
Bartering presents economic and accounting issues, as well as

income tax problems.

There are unresolved questions about the defini

tion of income and about timing and valuation.

Services exchanged

among family, friends, and neighbors are probably gifts and therefore
not subject to tax.

In a direct exchange, the timing is certain

although the valuation may not be.

The Internal Revenue Code stipu

lates that income received in a form other than cash is to be reported
at fair market value.

But, this is often difficult to apply.

What is

the fair market value of a large block of otherwise unused space on

In a direct exchange between two

several hundred airline flights?

parties, the valuation problem is often somewhat alleviated because

value may be more readily apparent on one side of the transaction than
on the other.

However, the organized barter exchanges may exacerbate

the valuation problem by postponing one side of the transaction.
Transactions through a third-party barter exchange also give rise
to some technical timing problems.

The basic question is whether gain

should be recognized for tax purposes when credits are received from

the barter exchange or at some later date when actual goods or ser
vices are received for those credits.

An accrual-basis taxpayer would

report income at the time the services are rendered or the merchandise

21

delivered.

A cash-basis taxpayer, on the other hand, might reasonably

expect to report income when goods or services are received.

It is

not certain that barter credits will ever be exchanged for goods or

services, and typically there is no provision for refund for unused
credits.

Nevertheless, the IRS has ruled that barter exchange tran

sactions are taxable at fair market value at the time that goods or

services are rendered in exchange for credits (19).

22

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF UNDERREPORTING

By definition, the underground economy is susceptible neither to

precise measurement nor to definitive analysis.

Although it is dif

ficult to discern exactly why more and more people are participating
in the underground economy, several contributing factors can be iden

tified.
1.

The combination of high tax rates and high inflation can

cause taxpayers to find themselves with a lower real income,
yet a higher tax bill.

Otherwise law-abiding taxpayers may

reason that their tax burden has risen above their "fair
share."
2.

The increasing complexity of the tax law can erode public
confidence that the tax law is treating everyone fairly.

uneasy, perhaps even subconscious,

The

feeling that others are

escaping tax can be used as a rationalization for cutting a
few corners.

3.

Closely related to, and a substantial cause of, the complex
tax law is the use of the Internal Revenue Code to motivate

or impede certain social and economic activities.

What

Congress intends as a tax incentive may be perceived as a tax
loophole by some who are not in a position to utilize that par

ticular provision.

The perception that Congress is inten

tionally allowing wealthy taxpayers and big business to
escape taxes legally can be a strong motivation for others to

create their own tax savings.

23

4.

The increasing media attention to this problem may turn into

a self-fulfilling prophecy.

It becomes easier to rationalize

tax cheating on the grounds that "everyone else is doing it."
5.

The changes in social mores and general morality that have
been evident in many walks of life also have had an impact in

the tax arena.

Many people seem to have less confidence in,

and respect for, many of society’s, institutions, including

government, the church, universities, big business , and big
labor.

There is a growing feeling that it is acceptable to

ignore "unfair" laws...

6.

There is a growing perception that the IRS enforcement prac

tices are applied in an unevent and inequitable fashion,
whereby low— and middle-income taxpayers are. harassed over
small amounts, while insufficient attention is paid to the

wealthy and especially to nonfilers.
7.

Increasing government rules and regulations and payroll taxes

provide motivation for many businesses to. keep employees off.
the books.
8.

A perception—whether correct or not—of widespread waste and
inefficiencies in government is often used by some to justify

their underreporting.
9.

There may well be a lack of understanding on the part of
many taxpayers as to —
o

The fact that underground types- of income are taxable.

o

The risk involved in the failure to report fully.

o

The serious impact the underground economy can have upon
society in general.
- 24 -

EXPERIENCE ABROAD

The underground economy is not a phenomenon exclusive to the
United States.

It seems to thrive in many, perhaps all countries,

regardless of their political or economic systems.

The largest underground economy is believed to be Italy's
1'economia submersa, which has been estimated at 30 to 35 percent of

the regular economy, or $43 billion (3).

Feige states that the

underground economy is smaller in Scandinavian countries, where there

is a "social contract" between the government and the citizens, than
in Italy, where "respect for authority has been crumbling for

centuries" (7).

Nevertheless, Sweden is estimated to have a secret

economy equal to 10 percent of the national product and a loss of tax
revenue equal to 15 percent of the budget (3).
France’s travail au noir, may constitute 25 percent of the offi

cial economy.

West Germany's Schwarzarbeit may equal $25 billion in

untaxed labor income and $4 billion in lost tax revenues, in addition
to uncollected payroll taxes.

Britain's fiddling was estimated to be

7 to 8 percent of the national output in 1979, but may now be as much

as 15 percent.

Less than 10 percent of Thailand's 19 million workers

file tax returns, and up to 40 percent of all Argentine business is

involved with morocho, or the black money market (3, 17).

These sta

tistics indicate that the underground economies abroad are at least as

large as in the United States.

The problem in Europe has been deemed

serious enough for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to authorize a study of the legal and administra 
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tive provisions pertaining to tax avoidance and evasion in member

countries (16).
The reasons given for emergence of sizeable underground movements

abroad include —

o

High tax rates or steeply progressive tax schedules.

o

The combination of high tax rates, budget deficits, and

inflationary pressures.

o

The high percentage of cash transactions.

(One half of

Britain’s labor force is paid in cash.)

o

The large percentage of workers in agriculture, an activity

that traditionally has been kept off the books.

(Extensive

moonlighting has been a tradition in France.)

o

Deep distrust of government.

o

Government inefficiency.

o

High labor costs, which encourage firms to keep employees off
the books to avoid payroll and unemployment taxes.

o

Honest businessmen's feelings that they must join the

underground in order to remain competitive.

The number of workers engaged in moonlighting and regular jobs
kept off the books continues to expand as individuals and firms

struggle to meet inflated costs of living and business expenses.
Perhaps 5 percent of Europe's labor force and one third of Italy's
(65 percent of the government employees and teachers) are involved in

secret employment (3, 22).

Because of the minimal and inconspicuous

capital requirements, many home and personal services are provided by
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moonlighters.

It is estimated that one out of eight Britons earns as

much as $2,200 per year from moonlighting, yet efforts to control
moonlighting have been unsuccessful in Britain.

The same problem has

been observed in Belgium, France, and elsewhere.
Even if income is stated accurately, expenses may be overstated

or even fictitious.

Sales-type levies are often evaded, particularly

the value-added taxes, which are "easy to evade, despite myths to the

contrary" (17).
Perquisites are considered to be part of the "black economy" in
Britain, where consultants may be paid in claret, and a large percen

tage of the automobiles are owned by firms and valued at only one
third of what an independent appraisal would suggest for purposes of

imputing income (6).

"Friendship prices" and under-the-table

exchanges flourish from Thailand to France, as well as in Britain.

In

Japan, "backdoor admission fees" are paid to universities, and enter
tainment establishments increasingly evade taxes.

In the USSR, the

second economy is composed of private producers who must pay bribes to
facilitate production of goods and services unavailable from the state

(9, 21).

The diamond industry successfully evades taxes at all levels

of production in many countries (2).
Control measures are largely unsuccessful, but France has

launched a publicity drive against unlicensed house painters and arti

sans.

Britain has tried to fine construction firms using unregistered

workers, but fines have not successfully curbed this practice (3).
It has been suggested that less government supervision and involvement
are desirable, that self-policing through VAT and household deductions
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for repairs (against imputed income of owner-occupancy) be used, that

as much activity as possible be legalized, and that business and
employment costs be kept as low as possible (2, 15).

Tax treaties

should be designed to curb transfers between countries that might
result in evasion of tax.
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PUBLIC OPINION

There have been several interesting studies of public opinion
about the underground economy and tax cheating in general.

A Roper

study (20) found that a belief that tax cheating is widespread is a
stronger motivation for people to engage in bartering than is a belief

that taxes are too high.

A study conducted for the IRS by CSR, Inc.

(4) found that only 13 to 14 percent of the respondents report having

interacted with the underground economy , and, no more than 17 percent

agree with statements that tax cheating, is acceptable.

However, 27

percent admitted to being less than completely honest, and 9.1 percent
stretched the truth a little in filing their 1973 tax returns.
In ranking the relative severity of various crimes, only 58 per
cent. thought that stealing;. $500 from the government in taxes was "very

serious," compared to 711 percent who thought it a very/serious crime

to steal $500 in cash from an employer, 69 percent who would not ille
gally obtain.$500 in food stamps or welfare payments, and 62 percent

who would not countenance stealing $500 from a giant corporation (4).
In Britain, only 31 percent of those questioned thought it was
wrong to avoid tax on income earned in one’s spare time (17).

A

Westat, Inc., study (5) found that non compliance in the United States

is also greater on secondary sources of income.

Dollars withheld from

the principal salary are considered to be the government’s share,

while dollars received from a second job or from a hobby in which the
taxpayer invests time, material, and labor are regarded by many as

nontaxable.
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WAYS TO ALLEVIATE THE GROWING PROBLEM
While the underground economy is not susceptible to close scru
tiny and detailed analysis, several things can be done to help alle

viate the situation.
"quick fix."

It does seem clear that there is no single

It is also unlikely that any two or three minor adjust

ments will make significant inroads on the problem.

Real progress

will require the coordinated efforts of Congress, the IRS, and other
government agencies, and perhaps a major assist from the private sec

tor.

Attempts to educate the general public and reduce its

willingness to participate in the underground economy will be more
effective if they are initiated and conducted by nongovernmental
groups.

Two general strategies have been suggested from time to time as
possible solutions.

Some say that more and better enforcement by the

IRS is all that is needed.

Others suggest that simply lowering the

tax rates will substantially mitigate the problem.

While both may be

helpful, it is doubtful that either is a panacea.
Although the consensus both here and abroad is that high tax

rates are a major contributing factor in the growth of the underground

economy, it does not necessarily follow that reducing tax rates will
cause the problem to disappear.

Individuals who were motivated to

find creative ways to avoid 70 percent tax rates may well continue
those activities to avoid 50 percent tax rates.

The underground econ

omy seems to thrive in most countries around the world, regardless of

whether their tax rates are higher or lower than ours.
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Enforcement Activities

The IRS has estimated that a revenue agent can produce as much as
$20 for every $1 of cost.

More and better enforcement is, undoubt

edly, needed and desirable.

However, no one knows or can predict the

level of enforcement that would be necessary to change the underground
situation appreciably; and even if it were known, it is not certain

that the IRS could attract enough good professionals to reach that

level of enforcement, given the existing shortage of such individuals.

Given the trend toward earlier retirement ages, the IRS should con
sider recently retired CPAs and other business executives as a new

source of qualified personnel.

However, it is important to consider

what level of government surveillance and investigation the American
society is willing to accept.

At what point might the cure become

more oppressive than the disease?

The IRS can improve its effectiveness by reallocating some of its

present enforcement personnel and efforts.

Many tax practitioners

around the country feel that too much time and effort are being
devoted to unproductive trivia when they could be applied to the
underground economy.

Even with improved efficiency, however, it seems

apparent that the IRS will need additional personnel if it is to have
much impact on the underground economy.
As one step, Congress should authorize additional resources for

the IRS with the mandate that these resources be used on the

underground economy.

While the mood of the country today seems to

favor smaller federal budgets and less government interference,

it is

likely that the large majority of citizens who are filing properly
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would welcome increased surveillance of those who are underreporting.

Although reduced federal spending may be generally desirable, an

increase in the IRS’s budget will normally produce a reduction in the
federal deficit.

Penalties
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 increases the penalties for
failure to file informational returns from $1 per return and a $1/000

maximum to $10 per return and a $25,000 maximum.

This is an important

step in the right direction, but we also recommend the following

changes in penalties.

For more than twenty years, the maximum penalty

for criminal fraud has been $10,000 per count.

Whatever deterrent value

this provision may originally have had has seriously eroded due to the

declining value of the dollar.
adjusted for inflation.

The $10,000 amount should at least be

The penalty for civil fraud should be changed

from 50 percent of the total tax due to 100 percent of the tax due on

the fraudulently treated items.

Many years ago, certain penalties were waived for individuals who
voluntarily corrected prior underpayments.

The state of Illinois

proclaimed a two-week moratorium from December 28, 1981 through
January 8, 1982 during which time criminal penalties were waived for

taxpayers who voluntarily paid back taxes (1).

Such payments were

still subject to interest and civil penalties.

It has been suggested

that taxpayers who availed themselves of the Illinois moratorium may

have created problems for themselves at the federal level.

The

Treasury Department should consider cooperating with states in a
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program to encourage voluntary

catching up."

It might be more effec

tive to waive both criminal and civil penalties in such cases, but it
does seem reasonable that interest continue to be charged.

To the

extent that the government already waives penalties in instances of

voluntary disclosures, this policy should be publicized.
Informational Reporting

History has shown that the level of compliance improves when the
individual knows that the IRS has, or will have, information about the
transaction or activity.

The IRS receives information from a variety

of sources, including the various Form 1099s; informational schedules
on tax returns, such as the partnership and the subchapter S schedule

Ks; and answers to questions on the many types of tax returns.
Presently, anyone in a trade or business is required to file a
Form 1099NEC for certain types of payments in excess of $600, but only

if those payments are made to individuals.

Such reporting should be

extended to include payments made by businesses to corporations, since

many individuals and other small businesses have incorporated in

recent years.

If this produces an unwieldy flood of paper to the IRS

or an unreasonable burden on the business community, a higher

threshold might be adopted.

For some time, copies of all 1099s have

been supplied to the government but not necessarily to the recipient of
the payment.

ERTA now requires copies to be supplied to the recipient

as well, as is presently required for 1099s filed for interest and

dividend payments.

If the taxpayer is aware that a Form 1099 has been

filed, he is more likely to declare the payment as taxable income.
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It is impractical and unreasonable to require taxpayers to attach

copies of all 1099s to the tax return, as presently required for W-2

withholding statements and interest and dividend receipts that exceed

a certain threshold.

However, the $600-type payments usually are

included in a gross income figure so that any matching by the IRS is
virtually impossible.

Requiring a list of such payments in excess of

some reasonable threshold would be one possible means of facilitating
such matching.

At the very least, the total of all 1099s received

should be reported as a separate item on the tax return.
California has adopted a requirement that anyone claiming a rent

credit on the state income tax return must provide the name and
address of the landlord.

The federal government has a somewhat simi

lar requirement for taxpayers claiming a credit for child or dependent

This requirement should be extended to include other credits,

care.

such as the energy credit, for payments above a reasonable threshold.

The Federal Reserve Board requires that banks report certain

large deposits or withdrawals of cash, but it is our understanding

that this requirement is generally ignored.

The tax authorities

should either initiate their own reporting requirement or prevail upon

the Federal Reserve Board to enforce the current requirement more

vigorously.

All businesses should be required to report cash transac

tions in excess of some reasonable threshold, such as $3,000 or
$5,000.

States should be required to provide the federal government and
the taxpayer with an informational 1099 on refunds of state taxes.
A system should be devised for reporting by the organized
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bartering exchanges.

They might be required to report all of the credits

issued to their members, or to report all transactions above a certain
threshold.

Similarly, some of the typically cash businesses such as

auction houses, art galleries, and dealers in collectibles and rare
metals might be required to report cash transactions above a reason

able threshold.
Several factors of informational reporting must be considered.
The benefits are both real and psychological; real in the sense that

the matching process can reveal the underreporting of income, and
psychological in the sense that the taxpayer who knows that an item
has been reported to the IRS is more likely to include it on the 1040.

Both benefits are reduced, however, if the IRS does not have suf

ficient manpower to match and follow up on the information received.

Withholding
As indicated by the 1979 IRS study (14), the level of voluntary

compliance is greatest when tax has been withheld at the source.

That

study also confirmed that the level of compliance is quite poor for

self-employment income.

An important portion of such income is earned

by independent contractors.

In 1979 the Executive Committee of the

AICPA Tax Division "approved support of the concept of withholding tax
from payments to independent contractors, subject to limitations and

exemptions no less extensive than those recommended at that time by
the Treasury Department" (Minutes, Federal Tax Division Executive

Committee, July 17, 1979).

This 1979 action was related to the

question of differentiating and defining employees and independent
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contractors.

However, such withholding could raise the level of tax

reporting by independent contractors.

In February 1982, the Federal

Tax Division Executive Committee endorsed the concept of withholding
on business payments to independent contractors, with two important

caveats.

It does not seem feasible to expect withholding by individ

ual households; thus, this requirement would not apply to activities
such as home repairs.

Secondly, it must be recognized that a payment

to an independent contractor becomes a part of gross income, whereas
the eventual tax liability is computed on net income.

Therefore, the

withholding rate should be kept quite low—perhaps 3 to 5 percent.

Even at a relatively low level, the withholding would be an important
factor in assuring that the contractor will include the payment in
reported income.
It has often been recommended that interest arid dividend payments

should be subject to withholding.

If the level of compliance could be

raised to that achieved on salaries and wages, the government would
collect some $2 billion to $4 billion more in income taxes based on
the 1979 IRS study (14).

In addition to this increased revenue, such
t

withholding might be an important factor in improving the image of
equity in the tax law, since many wage earners feel that investors
also should be subject to withholding.

Withholding on interest and dividends has been discussed exten
sively and has been considered seriously by Congress from time to
time.

Strong objections are raised—primarily on the grounds that it

would be unfair to those who will not owe as much tax as is withheld.
Furthermore, it is assumed that those individuals will be required to
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wait up to eighteen months to get a refund of the over-withheld tax.
Some proposals attempt to overcome this problem by providing that

low-income individuals and exempt organizations could file a statement
with each company indicating that less tax should be withheld.

This

procedure would overcome the first objection, but would impose serious
administrative burdens on both the payors and the. payees.

The payee

would need to file a certificate with every payor—perhaps ten,

twenty, or more corporations.

New forms would have to be filed for

every new investment, even for those that might be in place for a few
weeks or a few days. . Payors would be required to match these forms

with the investors’ names and to withhold at varying rates for dif
ferent payees.

Thus, we reject, as unreasonable and unworkable, any

graduated withholding system for interest and dividends similar to the
system presently in place for wages and salaries.

We do agree that in the interests of equity and maintaining the

federal revenue, some form of withholding on interest and dividends is

desirable..

Innovative thinking is needed to find a system that can

minimize the administrative burdens on both payor and payee and also
minimize any economic hardship on the payees.

It would be helpful if

Congress and the major groups of payors and payees would work toward
devising a viable system rather than simply objecting to any

suggestion of withholding.

We recommend that various approaches such

as the following be studied and tested.

One system would shift almost all. of the administrative burden to
the IRS.

A flat rate specified by Congress, perhaps 5 to 10 percent,

would be withheld by every payor from all dividends and interest.

3.7

Eligible individuals and exempt organizations would need to file only
one exemption certificate—with the IRS.

The IRS would then refund

the appropriate amounts on a quarterly basis.

In essence, this would

entail a deferral of 5 to 10 percent of interest and dividends for

three to six months by those who would not owe the full 5 to 10 per

After the initial deferral period, the level of income

cent tax.

would be approximately the same as if there were no withholding.

This

would add a considerable burden to the administrative duties of the

IRS, but it would be less than the total burden otherwise borne by the
millions of payors and payees.
While the above suggestion should correct the major problems of a

comprehensive graduated withholding system, it would create new
problems, such as—
o

The IRS would get a single exemption certificate from each

payee but would have to match that with reports from payors
in several different IRS regions.

A quarterly refund may not

be feasible.
o

If the IRS did refund any excess withholding during the year,
the investor would still receive a report from each payor at

the end of the year indicating that tax had been withheld.

All of this withheld tax would not yet have been refunded,
and the taxpayer might be confused as to whether a credit

should be claimed on the 1040 for some or all of the withholding.

If the flat rate withholding is held to a relatively low
level—say 5 percent—refunds may be due to only a small proportion of

investors.

It might be reasonable to ask those investors to wait
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until the end of the year to get their refunds on the basis of the
regular filing.

This suggests at least two additional plans for

consideration:

1.

Withhold 5 percent from all dividends and all business
interest payments and provide refunds at the end of the
year to exempt organizations and to those payees who owe

less than the 5 percent tax.
2.

Allow exempt organizations to file exemption certificates
with each payor who would then withhold the flat 5 percent
from all other dividend and interest payments.

Refunds would

be at the end of the year.

In any system that provides for refunds after the end of the
year, it might be feasible to require the government to pay interest
from the end of the year in order to help alleviate any financial bur

den on the payees.

A 5 percent flat-rate withholding should obviate

one of the perceived administrative hardships.

The taxpayers should

not be required to attach withholding certificates.

A listing of all

interest and dividends should be sufficient.

If a viable system cannot be found to substantially reduce the

administrative costs to the payors, another approach might be to allow
the payors a tax credit to offset some or all of those costs.

If an acceptable comprehensive withholding system cannot be
found, the IRS might identify particularly troublesome situations and

impose withholding only in those areas.

For example, if compliance is

especially poor on taxable coupon bonds, income tax could be withheld
from those interest payments.

Institutions presently apply with
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holding on a selective basis (such as on nonresident aliens) and

should be able to apply it to specific types of bond issues.

In February 1982, the Executive Committee of the AICPA Federal
Tax Division endorsed the concept of withholding at the source of
interest and dividend payments provided that either the administrative

burden be shifted to the government or the cost of such withholding be
borne by the government.

Tips are another source of income that is seriously underre

The IRS estimates that only about 16 percent of tip income is

ported.
reported.

The IRS has made many studies and has estimated the normal

percentage of tip income in various types of establishments.

These

estimates have been accepted and upheld by the courts in several
cases.

However, even with these successful efforts, it seems clear

that the usual enforcement techniques are not likely to be economi
cally viable due to the large number of individuals involved and the
relatively low amount of tax per individual.

Various approaches used in the past have not been effective from
an enforcement point of view.

Other methods that have been proposed

from time to time have been subjected to severe criticism from the
businesses and the employees who would be affected.

If the various

interested parties could be brought together to explore some innova

tive ideas, perhaps a mutually agreeable solution could be found.

It

would seem preferable for such a meeting to be sponsored by an organi

zation that is not directly involved in the issue.
As an independent party, the AICPA Federal Taxation Division

should invite representatives of the various industries and employee
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groups to come together to find an acceptable approach.

These

interested parties should come realizing that this is a serious

problem for which a solution must be found.
any and all approaches to the problem.
needed.

The group should explore

New and innovative ideas are

Two such ideas that should be explored are suggested here,

but all parties should attempt to come up with as many others as

possible.
A low, flat rate tax could be collected from hotels, restaurants,
airports, or other establishments where tips are common.
The
establishments could then be authorized to withhold or otherwise
collect the appropriate amounts from the employees.

The income of establishments could be grossed up to include the
estimated tip income of the employees.
A deduction would be
allowed for the amounts reported as employee compensation. This
approach also might incorporate a withholding mechanism.
The IRS 1982 study shows that the tax gap on pension income is

growing much more rapidly than the total gap.

This trend is likely to

continue as larger numbers of taxpayers receive pensions from a larger
number of plans.

This is a confusing area for many taxpayers because

social security is tax-free, and varying amounts of many other pen
sions represent tax-free return of capital, while many pensions are

100 percent taxable.

Presently, pensions are subject to informational reporting on
Form 1099R.

The pensioner may request withholding at the source.

We

recommend that all taxable pension payments be subject to a modest

(say 10 percent) flat rate withholding tax with the pensioner having
two options:

1.

Withholding at a higher rate
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2.

Exemption from withholding if it can reasonably be expected
that no tax will be due

Currency Reform
There is another long-range approach that we have not seen

discussed anywhere else.

Although it is removed from the tax arena,

intuitively it would seem to be worthy of consideration as a possible
deterrent to the underground economy.

The vast majority of transac

tions in the underground economy, other than bartering, are conducted

with cash.

In the modern world of computers and other electronic

devices, there have been suggestions from time to time that modern
technology may eliminate the need for cash.

Credit cards, electronic

fund transfers, paying bills by telephone, and shopping via cable

television have all been suggested as the "wave of the future."

It

might be worthwhile for the government to take steps to encourage

those developments and hasten the day when we might need little or no
currency in circulation.

An experiment along these lines that the government might try in
the near future would be to withdraw from circulation all bills larger

than the $50 bill.

In a widespread but completely unscientific survey

of people in the business community, we have found no evidence that
any legitimate Economic activity would be seriously disrupted if there

were no $100 bills in circulation.

Yet, the number of $100 bills in

circulation has increased far more rapidly than any other denomina
tion.

If it can be presumed that most of these bills find their way

into both the informal and the illegal segments of the underground
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economy, the absence of such currency could be a deterrent to those

activities.

If it is deemed necessary or desirable to have $100 bills

in our currency system, an approach used in Switzerland might be used

to produce some of the same benefits.

Under the Swiss system the $100

bills, and perhaps the $50 bills, would expire periodically.

Anyone

holding such currency would be required to exchange it at a bank.
Miscellaneous suggestions

The following are additional suggestions that should be

considered:
o

States should be required to withhold from payments to lot
tery winners above a reasonable threshold.

o

Tax deductions should be denied for cash payments (other than

W-2 type wages) above a reasonable threshold.

o

Reporting of capital expenditures,

including additions to the

basis of residential or other property, should be mandatory.

o

Deduction for the cost of incentives or prizes should be

denied if the value is not included in a Form 1099 (such as
the prizes awarded to customers who open new accounts).

o

Questions could be added to the individual 1040, Schedule C
regarding any bartering or currency transactions.

Educational Programs
Some individuals may underreport income simply because they do

not understand that the income should be reported.

In addition, even

those individuals who know they are underreporting may not understand
all the potential consequences to themselves or to society.
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Educational programs might be as effective as major increases in

enforcement activities and would very likely be more acceptable to
society.
The government should increase its education efforts.

A con

certed effort should be made to counter the negative publicity given

More publicity should be given to the number

the underground economy.

of returns filed, the amount of tax paid, and the relatively high

level of voluntary compliance.

The IRS should better publicize its

enforcement activities and the results thereof.

Instructions for the

various tax returns, as well as releases to the popular media, could

be used to explain that bartering and currency transactions are to be

reported.

Special efforts could be directed at those groups more

likely to be noncompliers.

It is highly unlikely, however, that government educational
programs alone will be sufficient.

Statements from the government are

often considered to be self-serving and are viewed by many citizens

with a great deal of skepticism.

Any effort to modify society's views

toward the tax system and toward responsibilities to society and to
government would be far more effective if it were sponsored by groups

outside the government.

Such an effort would indeed be a major under

taking, requiring the resources of many groups, and it would be far

more effective if it were a cooperative venture involving a wide
variety of different types of organizations.

For maximum exposure and

impact, the program should be cosponsored by professional organiza

tions, trade associations, labor groups, and civic organizations.
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Such an educational program should utilize all media and should emphasize such points as—

o

The present voluntary compliance system is valuable and
should be preserved.

o

The large majority of taxpayers do pay their tax.

o

Most so-called loopholes are really incentives approved by

Congress to improve our economic or social structures.

o

The typical underground transactions are indeed taxable,

should be reported, and are reported by most taxpayers.
o

The possible consequences of participating in the underground
economy include both personal risks and institutional con
sequences of excessive government enforcement.

o

We cannot "cheat the government"; any underpayment simply
adds to the burden of fellow citizens.

45

LIST OF REFERENCES

(1)

Associated Press.

"State Gives Tax Cheats A Break."

As reported

in the Champaign-Urbana (Illinois) News-Gazette, December 24, 1981.

(2)

Bawly, Dan.

The Subterranean Economy.

New York:

McGraw-Hill Book

Co., 1982.

(3)

"Cheating on Taxes—A Worldwide Pursuit."

U.S. News & World

Report, October 22, 1979, pp. 53, 56.
(4)

CSR, Incorporated.

"A General Taxpayer Opinion Survey."

Prepared for Office of Planning and Research, Internal Revenue

Service, Washington, D.C., March 1980.

(5)

Ekstrand, Laurie E. "Factors Affecting Compliance:

and Survey Results."

Focus Group

NTA-TIA Proceedings of the 73rd Annual

Meeting, 1980, pp. 253-261.

Economist, September 22, 1979.

(6)

"Exploring the Underground Economy."

(7)

Feige, Edgar L. "How Big is the Irregular Economy?"

Challenge,

November-December 1979, pp. 5-13.
(8)

--- .

"The Irregular Economy:

Implications."

Its Size and Macroeconomic

Social Systems Research Institute, 7916.

University of Wisconsin-Madison, May 1979.

(9)

Gelber, Alexis.

"Underground Millionaires."

September 7, 1981, p. 36.

46

Newsweek ,

(10)

Gutmann, Peter M. "Are the Unemployed, Unemployed?"

Financial

Analysts Journal, September-October 1978.

(11)

--- .

"Statistical Illusions, Mistaken Policies."

Challenge,

November-December 1979, pp. 14-17.
(12)

--- .

"The Subterranean Economy."

Financial Analysts Journal,

November-December 1977.
"The Subterranean Economy."

(13)

--- .

(14)

Internal Revenue Service.

"Estimates of Income Unreported on

Individual Income Tax Returns."
(15)

Taxing & Spending, April 1979.

Publication 1104, September 1979.

"Making the Best of the Black Economy."

Economist, June 30,

1979, pp. 73-74.

(16)

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Tax

Evasion and Avoidance. A report by the OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs (1980).

(17)

"The Outlook:

Off-the-Books Business Booms in Europe."

Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1981.

(18)

"Prying Open the Underbelly Economy Reveals a Can of Worms."
Washington Post, July 26, 1981.

(19)

Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100

(20)

Roper Organization, Inc. "Third Annual Tax Study." Commissioned
by H & R Block, July 1979.

47

(21)

Simis, Konstantin.

"Russia’s Underground Millionaires."

Fortune, June 29, 1981, pp. 36-50.

(22)

"Tax Bite Forcing More People to Hold Secret Second Jobs."
Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1980.

(23)

U. S. General Accounting Office.

"Using the Exact Match File for

Estimates and Characteristics of Persons Reporting and Not

Reporting Social Security Self-Employment Earnings."

HRD-81-118, July 22, 1981.

48

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Donald C. "Opinion Surveys of Public Attitudes Toward the

Federal Income Tax System."

Tax Notes, May 29, 1978, pp. 579-580.

"A New Report Expands the ’Irregular' Economy."

Business Week,

December 10, 1979, p. 26.
"Assessing Profits."

Accountant, February 12, 1981, pp. 154-155.

"Au not so clair de la lune."

Economist, May 5, 1979, p. 95.

"Barter Club Credits to Members Are Gross Income."

The Tax Adviser,

(June 1980), pp. 373-374.

"Barter:

Comic Books to Big Jets."

New York Times, May 9, 1981.

"Bartering and Surplus/Waste Exchanges."

Small Business Report, March

1979, pp. 21-22.

Caplin, Mortimer.

"Uncovering the Underground Economy."

Wall Street

Journal,. March 31, 1980, p. 22.

"Collecting from the Not-so-Willing."

Tax Notes, October 5, 1981,

p. 799.

Fidelman, Ida Danon.

"Bartering for Profit and Fun."

Redbook Magazine, April 1980, p. 12.
Fierro, Robert D. "Off the Books Economy."
pp. 27-33.

49

Prime Time, October 1980,

Flanagan, William G., ed. "Barterers Beware."

Forbes, August 17,

1981, p. 102.

Harris, Daniel C. "Underground Economy:

The Federal Role."

What Can and Should Be Done:

NTA-TIA Proceedings of the 73rd Annual Conference,

1980, pp. 262-266.

Henry, James.

"Calling in the Big Bills." Washington Monthly,

May 1976, pp. 27-33.

Hoff, Reka Potgieter.

"Tax Withholding at Source Would Reduce

Underreporting of Income on False Returns."

Tax Notes, February 22,

1982, pp. 443-450.

"How Tough Will IRS Get?"

Interview with Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.-,

Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

U.S. News & World Report, April 20,

1981, pp. 42-43..

"Income Taxes—New Crackdown by IRS?"

U.S. News and World Report,

April 19, 1982.

"IRS Increases Attack on 'Barter' Transactions."

Taxation for Accountants

January 1980, p. 40.

Koretz, Gene, ed. "Economic Diary:

Underground Rentals."

Homeowners Find Refuge in

Business Week, April 20, 1981, p. 16.

Kramer, Marcia, and Moritz, Owen.

"Where Are They?

New York Daily News, February 11, 1979.

50

Hidden Billions."

Lederman, Leon M.

"Cashless Society Would Cut Taxes, Bring

Unemployment—to Criminals."
Lohr, Steve.

Plain Dealer, May 1, 1981.

"How Tax Evasion Has Grown."

New York Times,

March 17, 1981.
"Contrary to Popular Belief, Bartering. Is Not a Dead

Lundquist, John.

Art." Ann Arbor News, October 18, 19-81, p. 10.

MacAvoy, Paul W.,

"The Underground—No Recession There."

New York Times,

July 4, 1982.

Maital,

Shlomo.

"The Tax-Evasion Virus."

Psychology Today,

March 1982, pp. 74-78.

"New IRS Penalties for Tax-Shelter Investors Increase Danger of
Typical Year-End Schemes."

Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1981.

"Reining in the IRS on Policy."

Business Week, April 6, 1981, p. 31.

"Underground Economy:

Rothenberg, Leon.

What Can and Should Be Done:

NTA-TIA Proceedings of the 73rd Annual Conference,

The State Role."
1980, pp. 267-270.

Rowe, James L. "Night Ladies, Light Fingers, Moonlight Jobs Are Fooling

Those Government Figures."

Washington Post, September 21, 1980.

Schultz, Terri.

"The

Segal, Bennett.

"Inflation Creates Crisis of Confidence."

Untaxed Millions."
New York Times, March 16, 1980.

Indianapolis Business Journal, August 18, 1980.

- 51

Silk, Leonard.

Simon, Carl P., and Witte, Ann D.

Economy.

Beating The System:

"Unemployment Lines Weave Hopelessness Through

Wall Street Journal,

Western Europe."

The Underground

Auburn House Publishing Co., 1982.

Boston:

Spivak, Jonathan.

Stapleton, Constance.
Money."

New York Times, April 27, 1979.

"The Hidden Economy."

October 14, 1981, pp. 1, 12.

"Barter—or Getting What You Want Without

Woman's Day, January 15, 1980, pp. 70, 72, 124, 126.

Tauzi, Vito, ed. The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad.

Lexington Books, 1982.

Lexington, Mass.:

IRS Owed $10.9 Billion in Delinquent Taxes."

Tax Administration:

Daily Report for Executives.

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,

October 7, 1981, pp. G-1, 2.
"Tax Administration:

26 Percent of U.S. Taxpayers 'Cheat' on Taxes,

Study Released by Rosenthal Shows."

Daily Report for Executives,

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., April 16, 1980.

Finance Panel to Consider Four Miscellaneous Bills

"Tax Legislation:

at Nov. 6 Hearing."

Daily Report for Executives, The Bureau of

National Affairs, Inc., October 30, 1981, p. G-l.
"Tax Shelters:
Shelter Cases."

IRS Sets New Policy Easing 'No Settlement' Stand in

Daily Report for Executives, The Bureau of National

Affairs, Inc., October 30, 1981, p. G-3.
"The Clandestine Underground Economy."

ballas Morning News, August 16-18, 1981.
52

A series of three articles from

"The Great National Rip-Off."

U.S. News & World Report, July 3, 1978,

pp. 27-31.

"The Income Farmers Hide."

Business Week, April 17, 1978, pp. 91, 94.

"The Underground Economy." A series of five articles from Washington

Post, July 21-26, 1981.

"The Underground Economy's Hidden Force."

Business Week, April 5,

1982, pp. 64-70.
Travis, Gretchen. "King of the Swappers." Republic Scene Magazine,

January 1980, p. 54.

"Treasury:

IRS Needs More Money for Audits, Collections, Regan Tells

Senate Panel."

Daily Report for Executives,

The Bureau of National

Affairs, Inc., April 1, 1981, pp. G 11, 12.

Tuhy, Carrie.

"What the Underground Economy Costs You."

Money,

April 1981, pp. 74-77.

"Uncovering the Underground Economy."

"Underground Economy Grows and Grows."

Dollars & Sense, May-June 1982.
Wall Street Journal,

October 20, 1980, p. 1.

U.S. General Accounting Office.
Delinquent Taxes."

"What IRS Can Do to Collect More

GGD-82-4, November 5, 1981.

"Using Barter as a Way of Doing Business."
1980, p. 57.

53

Business Week, August 4,

"The I.R.S. Muscles the Middle Class."

Volkman, Ernest.

Family Weekly

April 19, 1981, p. 6.

"Withholding:

Long Rules Out Hearings on Plan to Withhold on

Interest, Dividends."

Daily Report for Executives,

The Bureau of

National Affairs, Inc., April 15, 1980, p. G-10.

Wolfe, Singleton B. "Magnitude and Nature of Individual Income Tax
Noncompliance."

NTA-TIA Proceedings of the 73rd Annual Conference,

1980, pp. 271-277.

Wolk, Suzanne.

"Going Underground."

54

People & Taxes, August 1981.

M061038

